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Author Meets Critics: a panel discussion of Jennifer Germon’s 
Gender: a Genealogy of an Idea (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), held 
at the Sociological Association of Aotearoa/New Zealand, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 9 December 2011. 
 
Annabel Cooper (chair), Rhonda Shaw, Melanie Beres, Rosemary du Plessis 
and Jennifer Germon  
 
Annabel Cooper: 
It is one mark of a good book that it can make you change your mind. For me, 
Jennifer Germon’s Gender: a Genealogy of an Idea resolved some of the 
questions that had been hovering around my first-year introductory paper on 
Gender – and made me change it. It asked some hard questions of a famous 
article which I had held dear for years. And it emphatically returns to the notice 
of gender scholars some figures many of us have not wanted to address 
seriously for some time now – most especially, that valorised and vilified 
alumnus of Victoria University, John Money. 
          Gender: A Genealogy of an Idea makes two key interventions, as I read 
it, into the prevailing feminist narrative of the term gender. The first is that it 
points out that the origins of the term were not in feminism but in sexology. We 
hadn’t exactly forgotten this, but it has certainly been a while since we’ve given 
these origins much airtime. Jennifer’s first two chapters deal in detail with this 
emergence of the term and its development in the work of John Money and 
Robert Stoller, beginning in the 1950s. She turns then to discuss how the 
concept migrated unevenly and intermittently across to the emergent field of 
feminist scholarship and was taken up as a core concept. 
          The second key intervention the book makes is to effect the return of the 
repressed in the debates around gender: the intersexed, whose bodies and 
subjectivities as she points out were Money’s starting point, and have emerged 
at points in the genealogy since but only ever momentarily. At every turn, she 
contends, the intersexed problematise the binary structure of gender as we 
persist in reiterating it, but at every turn the theorist’s gaze is averted from them, 
as binary gender is reasserted against the evidence. Even more damningly, eyes 
were averted from the medical and psychiatric practice of several decades in 
which surgical intervention to remove ambiguity was routine. The book asks us 
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to examine the grounds for the oppositional framework which has become such 
a habit of mind in thinking about gender, and entirely to rethink it as a result. 
          I think this is a brave and exciting book and that it may be part of a game-
change occurring in Gender Studies. It critically re-examines the field as well as 
the idea of gender; and it is exciting to be in a field that is undertaking this kind 
of enquiry.  
          We have three speakers talking about this book today: Dr Rhonda Shaw 
of the Sociology/Social Policy Programme, Victoria University; Dr Melanie 
Beres, Department of Sociology, Gender and Social Work at the University of 
Otago, and Associate Professor Rosemary du Plessis, of the School of Social 
and Political Sciences, University of Canterbury. 
 
Rhonda Shaw: 
Thank you to the organisers of this session for inviting me to comment on 
Jennifer’s book.  I was interested to read the book because I have taught 
undergraduate courses on gender, in three different New Zealand universities, 
for eleven years.  I want to focus on three aspects of the book in my comments 
today.  Given the composition of today’s diverse audience I will keep what I am 
going to say fairly general.   
          One of the important points that Jennifer makes right at the beginning of 
the book is that the concept of gender did not exist 60 years ago; it was 
introduced by John Money in 1955 and gradually entered social science 
discourse from the 1970s onward.  The term has subsequently become so 
naturalised, particularly for English speakers that it is thoroughly taken for 
granted today, not just in academic circles but in everyday parlance as well.  As 
Jennifer points out we ‘nowadays assume the concept has always been 
available’ (2009: 4).  
          Anecdotal evidence tends to confirm this.  If people are forced to think 
about the meaning of the term gender they often assume we all have a gender, 
which corresponds to our so-called sex and that this is set in stone.  To give you 
a sense of what I mean, for the last eight years I have been teaching a Stage I 
Sociology course on gender and social inequality and every year I set exam 
questions asking students to comment on sociological conceptions of gender, 
and to explain what sociologists mean when they say gender is an organising 
principle of social life.  It is not difficult to imagine the variety of answers one 
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might get.  Some of these answers not only sit on the margins of sociological 
thinking but also on the margins of common sense.   
          According to one stage I sociology student I had one particular year, ‘men 
are musculint and women are feminite’.  I have also had comments on 
masculinity and performativity – possibly as an attempt to reflect on Hugh 
Campbell’s work on (pub)lic masculinity – such as: ‘Masculinity is something 
like drinking beer, where you stand around with your mates, talk bollocks and 
do masculine things like burp, swear, and chug beer down.’  One of my 
personal favourites, however, is a response to a question about gender and the 
sexual double standard, a statement leaving us in no doubt that female sexuality 
remains instrumentalised by contemporary culture.  To quote this student: 
‘Women are called bitches, skanks and hoes.  They wear halter tops and mini-
skirts, but of them most don’t look any good.’  
          Admittedly these are not the best answers we get.  I tested this with my 
own daughter, who is currently doing a BA major in Philosophy and has been 
living with her feminist mother for 18 years, when I was preparing this 
presentation.  Off-the-cuff she gave me her definition: ‘Gender is a social 
construction that we use to classify people as members of a binary system 
where they conform to one or other set of behavioural and identity norms 
corresponding to their perceived sex.’  By and large, however, our students 
recount trite sociological explanations of gender as culturally acquired and sex 
as fundamentally biological.  Numerous teachers of gender will no doubt concur 
that they have received answers from students claiming, ‘biologically, your 
gentiles determine gender.’   
          To be fair, I am not surprised that some students are bamboozled by the 
concept, and I think this is compounded for undergraduate students taking 
different courses with a gender composition in different disciplines.  So, I was 
keen to read Jennifer’s book to see how she would tackle defining the term.  I 
soon discovered, as the concept “genealogy” in the title of the text indicates, 
that this is something Jennifer explicitly states she is not going to do (Germon, 
2009: 2 & 15).  My first question, on behalf of new students to sociology, is 
why Jennifer decided to omit a definition of gender in the text.   
          There is much to like about this book.  One of the significant dimensions 
of the text for me is that it reintroduces John Money’s work to a new generation 
of feminist scholars and students of gender studies.  That is important, 
especially for those of us who have pondered the sex/gender conundrum 
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through the lens of the post-structuralist feminist debates.  In fact, the first 
account I read that critiqued the sex-gender distinction was Moira Gatens’s 
essay, first published in a journal called Intervention in 1983 and subsequently 
republished in Imaginary Bodies in 1996.  As far as Gatens was concerned, it 
was Stoller, not Money, who was responsible for naturalising the sex = biology, 
gender = socio-cultural conditioning binary, and it was Stoller’s work that 
influenced a subsequent generation of feminist thinkers such as Greer, Millett, 
Oakley, Barrett, and so on.  In Gatens’s account Money isn’t mentioned at all. 
So, it was significant to see Money reintroduced by Jennifer in this book, and 
then followed by a chapter on Stoller.  
          Of course one of the other players in these debates around this time was 
Harold Garfinkel.  Garfinkel first collaborated with Robert Stoller at UCLA in 
1959 on the case of Agnes, a young (19-year-old) woman who had first been 
referred to Stoller’s clinic as an individual with confused sex identity who 
wanted sex-reassignment surgery.  Garfinkel devotes a whole chapter to Agnes 
in his 1967 publication Studies in Ethnomethodology.  Jennifer, given that 
you’ve done such a great job of bringing these key figures Money and Stoller 
together, I wonder if there is a story behind the absence of Garfinkel in the 
book.  My sense is that Garfinkel’s absence may sit rather oddly for a 
generation of North American readers of sociology, especially those schooled in 
ethnomethodology and social interactionism and accustomed to the work of 
researchers such as Kessler and McKenna, West and Zimmerman, and so on.   
          Finally, to address the last point I want to make today: in the book 
Jennifer, you declare the usefulness of phenomenology to understand peoples’ 
account of their lived experience of intersex identity and sexuality.  You 
mention this in relation to Elizabeth Grosz’s discussion about the phantom limb 
(2009: 178) and how phantom limb experiences as loss have psychic 
implications similar to intersex surgery; for example, the excision of excess 
phallic tissue in Intersex Case Management (ICM).  
          This grabbed my attention because phenomenology as I understand it 
provides a way round the nature-nurture debates by suggesting that the body is 
co-existent with personhood.  So, changes to the body impact one’s sense of self 
and identity.  What I have discovered about phenomenology, in ethnographic 
work that I have recently done, is that it is an explanation of how we experience 
embodied subjectivity that doesn’t always map onto peoples’ actual accounts of 
their experience of body modification or bodily mutilation.  For instance, where 
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organ transplantation is concerned some people do take a holistic view of 
embodiment and mourn the loss of their body organ (like a diseased heart or 
lung) that they have been with for the past 30 years, and they experience unease 
about the relocation and incorporation of an alien organ from a foreign body in 
their own bodies. Some other people however quite readily seem to adopt a 
mechanistic view of the body as made up of spare parts and bits that are 
completely divested of the subjective origins of their donor, and they have no 
qualms about this.  There is also evidence to suggest that in terms of the psycho-
social well-being of the two groups, the latter have better outcomes 
(physiologically and emotionally) than the first group.  
          Now, organ replacement and intersex surgery are not analogous.  For a 
start, genital ambiguity is not life threatening, end stage renal failure is.  You 
make the point in the final chapter of the book that intersexuality really only 
threatens cultural convention.  Organ replacement may threaten religious and 
cultural convention too, but not to the same extent.  Perhaps more importantly, 
“normalising” corrective genital surgery, when undertaken on infants, as it 
typically is, breaches almost every bioethical principle we consider inviolable in 
a way that organ replacement therapy does not.  That is, it violates informed 
consent protocol, it is paternalistic, and it is often shrouded in deception and 
secrecy.  And this is particularly the case with intersex surgery on infants and 
children who later argue that these operations constitute violation and denial of 
their rights as intersexed people and autonomous subjects.  
          My last question is whether there is any ethnographic evidence available 
from within the activist intersex community to show that adults who had 
surgery without their knowledge as children were glad they had “corrective” 
surgery now they were older.  The relatively recent work of The Hastings 
Center’s Surgically Shaping Children project (see Parens, 2006) suggests there 
is little, if any.  Granted, this more a question about biomedical ethics and 
identity that sociology per se but given that the book ends with a focus on 
intersex politics I wonder if you could comment on this, Jennifer.  
 
Melanie Beres: 
Thank you for inviting me here to engage with Gender: a Genealogy of an Idea.  
I enjoyed reading the book and it was a nice change of pace to be able to sit and 
engage with a single piece of work in this way.   
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          To me, this book is about the place intersexed individuals have in the 
creation and development of our current understanding of gender, and to some 
degree sexuality.  Today I would like to use some of what Jennifer was writing 
about to springboard into thinking about dimorphic (or what Jennifer refers to as 
bipolar) gender in some more detail.  In particular I would like to engage with 
some activist writers who are attempting to forge new ground and position 
themselves in alternative spaces in between and alongside binary gender.  The 
main issue I want to focus on is the opening up of possibilities for identities that 
sit outside of the traditional/conventional/normalized binary gender categories 
of male and female. Here I am going to speak broadly and discuss not only 
intersexed bodies, but the bodies and identities of individuals who are not 
“intersexed” yet also challenge dimorphic gender.  Others, whose “sex” may 
appear to slot neatly into either “male” or “female”, may nevertheless feel that 
they do not fit into the category which was assigned to them.  Many then come 
out as transgender, transsexual or genderqueer. 
          One of Jennifer’s core arguments is that intersexed people were at the 
heart of the development of the concept of gender.  She reminds the reader that 
the “abnormal” (in this case intersexed bodies) is necessary to define the 
“normal”, yet the “abnormal” get erased once the concept is established.   So, 
while the concept of gender was developed by Money through his work with 
intersexed bodies, we seldom implicate intersexed bodies in our understanding 
of gender.  This got me into thinking about the way that language (as a rusty 
tool) makes intersexed and non-conventionally gendered people invisible while 
simultaneously rendering the privilege associated with being conventionally 
gendered invisible.  
          As Jennifer articulates throughout her book, intersexed individuals are 
rendered invisible in many ways.  In the English language there are two and 
only two pronoun options. Maintaining a gendered identity that is other than 
masculine or feminine is rather difficult.  Bodies are read as either masculine or 
feminine: many of us become uncomfortable when someone does not obviously 
fit into one or the other.  This becomes particularly visible in public toilets 
where many trans-people regularly face stares, questions and outright abuse.  
Yet despite all of the invisibility of those of us who challenge notions of 
dimorphic gender, there is also an invisibility associated with those of us who fit 
neatly into gendered categories.  This invisibility is illustrated here in a comic 
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by Sam Orchard, who is, in his own words – “a simple trans guy transitioning in 
New Zealand.”   
 
 
[Reprinted with permission of Sam Orchard.] 
As Sam’s comic illustrates there is an array of terms and words used to describe 
those of us who are “magically” gendered.  Other terms I have come across 
recently include multi-gendered and tri-gendered.  Yet even as I write this I 
struggle with what term to use to describe those of us who are, as Sam would 
say, muggles.  The above comic is funny precisely because it demonstrates the 
way the English language fails us.  The lack of an appropriate term renders 
talking about gender difficult, for what language are we left with? Normally 
gendered? Conventionally gendered? Traditionally gendered? Gender identity 
consistent with gender assigned at birth?  All of these terms are lacking, for 
being wordy, and for reinforcing the privilege that such a term could make 
visible. 
This is the invisibility of the privilege that comes with identifying with an 
unmarked category. To quote Calvin Thomas: 
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… straights have had the political luxury of not having to think about 
their sexuality, in much the same way as men have not had to think of 
themselves as being gendered and whites have not had to think of 
themselves as raced (2000:17). 
That is, those with privilege just “are”, and those who lack particular forms of 
privilege become representatives of the “label”.  This is perhaps most clear in 
relation to sexual orientation where it is only gay, lesbian, bisexual, or queer 
individuals who need to “come out”, who need to name their sexuality. 
          In the case of gender identity not only is the privilege associated with 
being “conventionally gendered” invisible and taken for granted.  This privilege 
has also remained largely nameless, making it that much more difficult to 
identify, discuss, question and problematise. 
To address this glaring absence in the English language some trans-
activist communities have begun using the term cisgendered.  My first 
introduction to the term cisgendered came in an essay written by one of my 
students in a social inequality paper. My initial reaction was two-fold. 
          Firstly, it was a delightful flashback to my organic chemistry days, 
learning about the directionality of molecular bonds.  In this context cis means 
“on the same side” and trans means “on the other side”.  To that end then 
cisgendered individuals’ gender identity would be “on the same side” – 
presumably on the same side of gender they were assigned at birth.  Trans-
identified people would then be considered on the other side to which they were 
originally assigned. 
          The second instant reaction I had to reading the term cisgendered was one 
of relief and excitement.  Finally, I thought I had been given a word that would 
allow me to talk about the privilege of being, shall we say…. cisgendered.  
Upon further reflection though, the term is not without significant problems. 
          Definitions of cisgendered have included “non-trans”, “conventionally 
gendered”, “someone who identifies with the gender they were assigned at 
birth” and “a person whose determinations of hir sex and gender are universally 
considered valid”. An examination of any of the definitions reveals that we are 
still left with many questions and potential gaps where there is still limited 
space for diverse gender expressions and identities.  These definitions are 
problematic for several reasons: 
- Firstly, cisgender creates yet another dichotomy, the trans-cis dichotomy.  
This includes all the problems that come with any binary.  At this point I am 
reminded of Jennifer’s discussion of genetics, and the wide diversity of 
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possible genotypes (XX, XO, XY, XXY).  She points out that without 
widespread testing our “knowledge” that girls are XX and boys are XY is 
called into question.  If genetics cannot easily categorize us into males and 
females, then we cannot expect to fit neatly into two categories after the 
added complexity of physiology, psychology and social forces. 
-  Secondly, the cis/trans dichotomy reinforces dimorphic gender, by implying 
that those who are trans are crossing gender lines as opposed to sitting in a 
gendered space that is neither or both masculine and feminine.  
- Thirdly, defining cisgender as someone whose gender is considered valid 
seems rather short-sighted.   While on the one hand it is open and not tied to 
bodies, on the other it is only a useful term for as long as “conventionally 
gendered” bodies are the only ones considered valid.  The gender political 
movement is about building recognition for trans/genderqueer identities.  
Once these do become “valid” what happens to the term?   
A final thought on the growth of the term cisgender. This last word is not so 
much a critique as it is a strength.  That is, this term and its meaning have 
grown out of grassroots activist work, not medical or academic theorizing. This 
point is rather significant.  Reading the history of the term gender as Jennifer 
describes it we become aware of how much our understanding of gender has 
rested in the hands of medical professionals and academics.  The pathologising 
of intersexed bodies came from a medical assumption of what ought to be, not 
an engagement of what ‘is’.  
          After decades of medical professionals deciding the possibilities of 
gendered being, it is refreshing to see trans, intersexed and genderqueer 
individuals taking matter and language into their own hands.  While similar 
activism has been ongoing for decades and perhaps centuries I am hopeful that 
with the technology and social media available today these challenges will find 
more purchase in the public realm.  
          I will end here with a quotation from Ivan E. Cayote, as she discusses her 
identity in relation to her work with high school students. In her words: 
I have never cared too much about what you call me. 
I’ve never been too hung up on labels, mostly because there are so 
few that stick properly to me. 
Four decades of straddling the gender fence has taught me many 
things.  
But it has been only recently that I figured out what to call myself. 
For years I have secretly yawned and answered the ubiquitous gender 
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pronoun preference question with a noncommittal shrug, thanking the 
asker for asking and then answering that they could basically call it 
like they saw it, that I didn’t really have a preference. And for years 
this was mostly true. Mostly. But lately I have been doing a lot more 
work in high schools, and it has changed me somehow. 
For years I told teachers to call me she, because it seemed simpler. It 
seemed like this would let the kids focus on the stuff I really wanted 
to talk to them about. I wanted to talk about how to make schools 
safer for everyone, not my gender identity. I convinced myself that 
who I was and how I identified was not all that important to the 
discussion.  
Then just recently, I started to tell the teacher to call me she for a 
whole different bunch of reasons. Somewhere along the line I realized 
that who I am and what I call myself might matter a whole lot to 
them. Because I want to stand up in front of a whole bunch of bodies 
coursing with newly minted hormones and prove to them that female 
bodies can look like just about anything their owners want them to. 
I want to stand up there and say, “That’s right, folks. Here I am. A big 
old freak with tattoos and muscles, boys’ pants and an AC/DC shirt. I 
look like a dude and you can call me Ivan. I am your principal’s worst 
nightmare come true. I am here to tell you that you can be whatever 
the fuck you can dream up. You can call me she, and I will call you 
whatever you want me to. I am a proud butch. Because for me, right 
now, in this body, on this planet, this feels like the most revolutionary 
thing I can do, and the most hardcore fuck-the-binary creature I can 
be. But that’s just me. 
 
 
Rosemary Du Plessis: 
Jennifer Germon’s Gender: an Genealogy of an Idea is a fascinating piece of 
intellectual detection. Its key purpose is to explore how ‘gender’ entered the 
social sciences, the humanities and everyday life as a way of talking about the 
social significance given to the categories male and female, women and men, 
boys and girls. It challenges some taken-for-granted assumptions about ‘gender’ 
and charts the ascendancy of this term in psychology, sociology, anthropology 
and feminist scholarship.  
          This book is much more than a well-researched, densely-footnoted and 
intellectually engaging review of how the concept of gender was introduced into 
psychology by John Money, picked up by Robert Stoller and then reworked, 
debated and integrated into feminist scholarship in the 1970s. It is a book with a 
keen political edge. Woven into Germon’s critical intellectual history is 
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attention to the implications for those variously defined as ‘hermaphrodite’, 
‘intersex’ or more recently ‘DSD’ (disorders of sexual development), of the 
prioritisation of social gender over biological sex. Ideas count–they have power 
and are closely related to social practices, in this case the practice of intersex 
case management (ICM). Over the last 60 years this has often involved surgery 
on anomalous sexed bodies in the interests of facilitating their integration into 
binary gender categories, or what Germon refers to as gender as “n = 2” 
(Germon, 2009: 195). 
          By the 1970s, what was termed the sex/gender distinction and the 
challenges to biological determinism associated with it were a vehicle for 
feminists to challenge sexism within social theory, push the boundaries of what 
girls and women can be and do, and extend their human rights. Germon argues 
that the focus on the significance of social gender rather than embodied sex had 
very different consequences for those whose genitals did not conform to what 
was defined as ‘normal’. It was not until the 1990s that those who were 
constructed as ‘intersexed’ by the medical profession started to have collective 
conversations and organise politically on the use of genital surgery on babies 
and children. At this point they directly challenged the arguments and practices 
of the medical profession and the psychologists whose analyses of the social 
significance of gender often underpinned this surgery.  
          While Jennifer Germon’s book engages intellectually with the 
development of the concept of gender in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, its project is 
fundamentally utopian. It looks forward to a time when the discipline of binary 
gender categories might be subverted, not only by the few courageous 
intersexed people, like New Zealand’s Mani Mitchell, who resist categorisation 
as either male or female, but by others who share their interests in a world less 
dominated by binary gender categories (Keir, 2002; MacDonald and Swan, 
2009). This is a world in which babies with genitals that doctors do not define 
as ‘normal’ will not receive ‘corrective’ surgery that puts at risk their capacities 
for sexual pleasure. It is a world in which people with complex combinations of 
chromosomes, gonads and genitals make decisions as adults about how they 
negotiate the social meanings, images, ideals and practices associated with 
gender. The world imagined is one in which transitions between gender 
identities are more openly accepted and living across and beyond categorisation 
as female or male would be understood and accepted. For these reasons, it is 
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very appropriate that the concluding session of a conference on ‘Looking 
forward: Trends, horizons and utopias’ is devoted to discussion of this book. 
          While we live in a transforming, increasingly digital and globalised world 
and increasingly encounter uncertainty and mutability, we also live in a world in 
which gender binaries persist and discipline the lives, not just of people who are 
intersexed, but everyone, even the yet to be born. This was brilliantly 
highlighted in Professor Anna Reading’s keynote address on gender and globital 
memory fields (Reading, 2011). Scanning and imaging technology mean that 
previously neuter fetuses are identified as male or female in the womb and 
begin their ‘premediated’ gendered biographies at twelve to fourteen weeks of a 
pregnancy. Depending on context, knowing the gender of the fetus may be the 
basis for terminating a pregnancy, the purchase of the ‘right’ clothes and toys as 
presents or even the information necessary for decorating the rooms they will 
occupy. Since up to ten percent of babies do not have the genitals anticipated on 
the basis of the ultrasound scan at 14 weeks, some children are now ‘reassigned’ 
at a later scan or at birth. For their parents, other family members and close 
friends they have, for a time, occupied a different social identity.  
          This highlights the ongoing social significance attached to gender, more 
than 40 years after western feminists used arguments against biological 
determinism to challenge how women and men might live, then and in the 
future. Things have changed as a consequence of that challenge–the place of 
women in political life, the professions, the academy, the armed services and 
sociology is very different–but the significance of gender distinctions continues. 
Sometimes I think that the quantity of pink clothes for girls (including 
gumboots), fairy outfits and princess costumes multiplies exponentially as 
women assume positions as prime ministers, judges, engineers, governor 
generals and CEOs. It seems that symbolic gender differences must be 
intensified, at least for preschoolers, as women penetrate some fields once seen 
only appropriate for men. There is an expanding popular literature on the 
continued marketing gender differentiation to girls and boys (Brown et al, 2009; 
Lamb and Brown, 2006; Orenstein, 2010). 
          Jennifer Germon’s book ends with a focus on intersex politics and 
possible futures. But earlier chapters took me back to my first engagement with 
the work of John Money (1965) and psychologists like Maccoby and Jacklin 
(1974) and Sandra Bem (1972). Like many others in the 1970s, I used the 
sex/gender distinction to challenge assumptions about inherent differences 
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between women and men based on genetics and hormones–prenatal and 
postnatal. This challenge was linked to thinking about alternative futures for 
women and men–different ways of organising family, work, political processes, 
education, the economy. Many of those perhaps naive expectations about what 
was possible have not been realised. However, the idea that most differences 
between women and men were at root social made it possible to look forward, 
to anticipate new horizons. I did subscribe to the view Germon (2009: 86) 
ascribes to 70s feminists - that “what was learned could be unlearned or in fact 
replaced by something altogether different”. 
          I vividly remember encountering Ann Oakley’s definitive assertions 
about the difference between biological sex and social gender which Jennifer 
discusses as a distortion of Money’s ideas in her chapter on ‘Feminist 
Encounters with Gender’. Oakley’s discussions of Money prompted me to read 
his work and I can remember debates about it in the opening weeks of the first 
Sociology of Gender honours course I taught in 1976. We looked critically at 
his John/Joan case and his assertion that the re-assignment of Joan was 
‘successful’ because she exhibited stereotypical feminine behaviour. As I 
remember it, discussions of Money’s work on sex/gender and intersex morphed 
into discussion of Sandra Bem’s work on androgyny and then a critique of how 
that work still rested on the reification of conventional models of masculinity 
and femininity.  
          Counter to what Germon suggests, this analysis of ‘gender’ did not 
involve exclusive attention to a cognitive ‘gender’ divorced from sex, sexual 
pleasure and the physicality of bodies. Gender for me at that time was not an 
exclusive attention to ‘consciousness’ divorced from ‘the body’– a trend 
Germon identifies in some feminist thinking (Germon, 2009: 86). This was, I 
think, because the contributions of psychology to thinking about the meanings 
and practices associated with being male or female were always running up 
against and complemented by other ideas–for example radical feminist body-
focused analysis and materialist Marxism. And in the small world of New 
Zealand feminist politics and academia, alternative theoretical positions were 
just down the corridor or across the room.  
          Unusually for a woman academic who identified as a feminist, but not 
perhaps for a sociologist, I taught ‘sex roles’ and ‘sociology of gender’ courses 
with a male colleague, Charles Sedgwick, who shared with me training as an 
anthropologist. In our classes reflections on biology and gender were 
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supplemented by cross-cultural analyses of gender and the challenges posed by 
other big conceptual agendas of 1970s and 1980s sociology – Marxist 
materialist analysis and its relationship with the theory and political practices of 
what was variously referred to as ‘the women’s movement’, the ‘women’s 
liberation movement’ or ‘feminism’.  
          As a result, the sort of gender analysis we taught focused on material 
relations between women and men and the ways in which erotic relationships 
and child-rearing occurred in the context of control of material resources such 
as land or money. For some years we used Yolanda and Robert Murphy’s 
ethnography of the Mundurucu Indians of Brazil, as a way to illustrate the 
intersection between material, sexual, embodied and ideological facets of the 
relationships between women and men (Murphy & Murphy, 1972). This was 
the basis for a gender-inflected attention to colonisation and political economy 
in this country and, finally, attention to local feminisms. Courses we taught 
ended in some ways where Jennifer’s book ends–with attention to theoretical 
and strategic debate among political activists and with ideas about what might 
be different. And I now want to return to the final chapters of this book.   
          As supervisor of several excellent doctoral theses that have problematised 
gender binaries (Roen, 1998; Phibbs, 2001), I was already acutely aware of both 
the inadequacies of binary understandings of physical sex and social gender. I 
had previously encountered the position that gender is learned, but also that 
“bodies are active participants in this process” (Germon, 2009: 190). But the 
theorised, carefully-documented tensions among intersex activists and their 
different strategies gave me a new appreciation of the complexities of intersex 
politics. Some of the differences among intersex activists mirror some of the 
tensions in the 1970s between liberal, radical and socialist feminists. There are 
strong parallels in debates among feminists and intersex activists about the 
dangers of collaboration with professional and bureaucratic institutions 
(especially medicine), but also links between the consolidation of difference 
through identification as ‘intersex’ and the inevitable tensions around 
organising as ‘women’ in the 1970s–which continue today.   
          Jennifer Germon charts differences in intersex politics with care and 
respect, while at the same time articulating her own position. This respect and 
acknowledgement of the work of those she assesses is a key feature of this 
book. John Money’s work is subjected to critique and yet he is in many ways 
the intellectual star of this book. She criticises his lack of attention to the 
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implications of his own evidence, but appreciates his recognition of the human 
capacity to exhibit what are conventionally defined as both ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine’ characteristics. She  argues that: “The strength of Money’s theories 
lie in his ... cognizance of the intricate relation between cells, environment, and 
experience; and in the capacity of his framework to readily accommodate 
temporal and structural change” (2009: 189). Money’s work is used to 
deconstruct the sex/gender binary and envision a future that is not dominated by 
gender binaries. Germon looks back through a detailed, critical and 
controversial analysis of Money’s ideas in order to look forward–to envision 
different futures. 
          The opening session of this conference addressed the relationship 
between sociological work and social change and involved several references to 
the Occupy movement. Jennifer Germon invites us to look at a social 
movement, definitely ‘globital’ (global and digital), involving a small group of 
activists who receive much less media attention. Together with an increasing 
number of intersex activists outside university contexts, she envisages a future 
in which what we currently call ‘gender’ is more genuinely multiple and 
dynamic – a project that I thought would have advanced much more rapidly by 
2011.  
          I am interested in how intersex activists are responding to this book and 
how trans and gender diverse individuals, organisations and communities are 
reacting to its arguments and its analysis of aspects of current intersex politics. 
Does it provide them with useful tools to think and work towards different 
futures? Or is this just a book for intellectuals, those who attend the conferences 
of the Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand or read the New 
Zealand Sociology? Can it convince others that we are all what Marcus 
Hirschfield referred to as “sexual intermediaries” (Germon, 2009:193-5), 
dynamically and uniquely combining and recombining biological attributes and 
behaviours defined as the qualities of different genders–but not under conditions 
of our own choosing?  
 
Jennifer Germon: 
Well, first I would like to acknowledge the fabulously rich engagement with my 
work by all of the panellists and to thank you all very much. It’s great to be 
coming back to home territory to talk about this work, and to hear how people 
are engaging with it in a local context. Thanks also to my fabulous hosts for this 
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trip: the Gender and Sociology crew at Otago including Annabel Cooper and 
Chris Brickell. 
          I’m going to start by responding to Rhonda’s question, on behalf of those 
puzzled students, about why I didn’t define gender. As good scholars we are of 
course supposed to define our terms. Yet it was clear that if I locked gender into 
a set definition, I wouldn’t be able to achieve what I was attempting to do. 
Specifically that was to explore the production of knowledge about gender 
across different domains, clinical, scholarly, and political. I was also interested 
in its material effects, effects borne out of the way in which gender was taken 
up in medical discourse particularly. What this project taught me was that 
gender is an incredibly dynamic concept. In fifty short years gender has become 
so naturalised into the English language that it appears to have always been 
available on the one hand, and completely self evident on the other. Not only 
has gender weathered a number of challenges and transformations, it appears to 
have thrived as a result. Therein lies its promise. 
          Gender had long been used in linguistics as a tool to determine which 
pronouns went with which nouns. John Money’s innovation was to take the 
term, retain its traditional denotations of masculine and feminine, and use it to 
explain how intersexed people were able to establish a rock solid gender 
identity as women or men. He went on to extend his ideas about gender 
acquisition to the wider population, providing an account for how everybody 
acquired their gender. At that point the concept of gender begins to move out of 
the clinic and take on a life of its own. That was aided in no small part by 
Robert Stoller’s intervention in the 1960s (the sex/gender distinction), and 
gender’s subsequent promotion by a number of key and influential second-wave 
feminist scholars during the 1970s. By the 1980s gender had become 
feminism’s central organising concept and as they say, the rest is history. 
          Of all the definitions of gender currently available it seems to me that 
Money’s model remains considerably more sophisticated than many that have 
followed in his wake. That is because Money remained cognisant of the 
interrelationship between cells, environment and experience. Bracketing the 
body from gender was as ludicrous in his view, as trying to bracket the mind. 
This is unsurprising perhaps for someone whose first monograph offered a 
strong critique of Cartesian dualism. For Money the sex/gender distinction 
represented the mind/body split in a contemporary guise and thus was 
untenable.  
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          So is gender a social construction? Well yes, but no more so than the 
category of sex. One of the things that I find really exciting about Money’s 
understanding of gender, is his insistence that we remember that learning is a 
function of biology. Often when I make that statement in a classroom context, 
there is often an audible gasp from students [sound effects] “But what do you 
mean? We know that gender is a social construct.” What I mean is, that all the 
experiences we have across our lifetimes, and every idea that we’re ever 
exposed to – including the idea that gender is socially constructed –are all 
mediated by the central nervous system. We cannot extract our bodies from our 
experience of being in the world. That is what appeals most to me about 
Money’s concept of gender. In saying that I’m not trying to elide any of the 
problematic aspects of his work, many of which I attend to in Gender. Nor is it 
to deny the price paid by the intersexed for the broad cultural investment in an 
oppositional way of knowing of gender.  
          As to Rosemary’s question about the response to my work from 
intersexed communities, I’m not going to make any claims to a homogenous 
response, since there is no homogenous way of doing politics or being 
gendered, or for that matter, intersexed. What I can say is that my work has 
been taken up in some quarters with interest. There is for example, a link to my 
PhD thesis on one of the intersex organisations’ website. But the type of 
response depends very much on what part of the political fence you’re referring 
to. What I would call the mainstream approach to intersex politics was not so 
enamoured of my work because by such an account, intersex has nothing to do 
with gender. I’m not able to say how trans communities have engaged with my 
work thus far: I simply don’t know.  
          So where is Harold Garfinkel in this book? He was of course a very 
important sociological thinker whose key legacy is a methodological one. 
Because my interest lay in gender’s movement through and across biomedical 
and social discourse I would say that Garfinkel’s work was somewhat 
peripheral to my project; it lay outside of the story I was telling. Stoller’s work 
was of more direct relevance to what I was doing in Gender because when he 
cleaved sex from gender Stoller was making an intervention at the level of 
discourse. Yet I think the spectre of Garfinkel is everywhere in the Stoller 
chapter of my book, writ large through my discussion of the case of Agnes. 
Agnes was a 19-year-old young woman who turned up at Robert Stoller’s clinic 
at UCLA seeking the removal of her fully formed penis and testicles. Agnes 
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recounted spontaneously experiencing the growth of masculine genitals at 
puberty. The source of great shame, she just wanted to be rid of them. Agnes 
puzzled the clinicians; they considered all the possibilities of how this ‘naturally 
feminine’ young woman came to have ‘normal-appearing’ male genitalia.  All 
the involved medics discounted the possibility that she could or would have 
self-medicated with exogenous hormones since it was unlikely a teenager would 
get the timing or the dosage right. Agnes was assigned a diagnostic category of 
intersex that her body actually contraindicated, tissue samples were taken and 
sent off to pathology, consultations among the consulting clinicians were held, 
and at the end of the day, Agnes was supported through sex reassignment 
surgery. After the surgery, Agnes disclosed that she had in fact taken her 
mother’s estrogen pills as a teenager and that her story had been a ruse to access 
surgery.  
          As to the limits of a phenomenological account of the embodied 
experience of say, amputation, organ transplantation, or intersex genital surgery, 
I take your point Rhonda but I wonder if we’re not talking about two distinct 
issues here, neither of which cancel the other out. I think that the various ways 
people respond to those kinds of embodied experiences, and their subsequent 
health outcomes are important issues for primary health care. I don’t know that 
such data diminishes the usefulness of Grosz’s ideas to my project however. 
Embodied phenomenology understands the body as a key instrument for 
experiencing the world and as a vehicle through which meaning is generated.  
Grosz’s discussion of the phantom limb suggests that in addition to a physical 
wound, such loss also leaves a psychic or spiritual wound, if you like. That 
analogy does resonate in some of the stories that intersex people tell about their 
experiences of medical and surgical mediation and the ways in which that 
mediation impacts on who and how they are in the world.  
          Finally I’d like to turn now to important point that Melanie made in 
relation to the issue of invisibility, an issue that haunts gender at every turn. 
Melanie honed right in on that most perverse of paradoxes with her analogy of 
the ‘rusty tool.’ While our understandings of gender are derived from the 
intersexed, under the terms of an oppositional model there is no place in gender 
for the intersexed as intersexed. This is what stimulates case management 
practices that are designed to fashion male- and female-like bodies from the 
bodies of intersexed people. Just as the intersexed are rendered materially and 
conceptually invisible by binary gender, so too is the privilege that comes with 
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being conventionally gendered. And while much of today’s discussion has 
turned on populations we would describe as sex and gender diverse, it’s 
important to acknowledge that these issues concern each and every gendered 
subject.  
          I’ll conclude by flagging my next project, which follows on from the 
work I did in Gender.  I have the rather modest ambition to develop and test a 
model of gender that is not reliant on oppositional thinking. I think that in the 
twenty-first century, our very complex socio-cultural worlds require a concept 
with a bit more bite. Rather than call for an end to gender, I’m interested in 
what insights might come from expanding our understanding of what the 
‘difference’ in gender difference looks like. What would happen if we accorded 
differences among genders with the same bearing that differences between 
genders are currently accorded? What, and importantly who, might be made 
visible? 
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